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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Monetary Fund maintains two distinct Ac-
counts for conducting its operations and transactions.' This was not
always the case. When the original Articles of Agreement2 were
drafted, provision was made only for one Account, which has subse-
quently been termed the General Account. Through it members of
the Fund have been able to purchase the currencies of one another
as they have encountered balance of payments difficulties.
After almost a quarter century of operation under the original
Articles of Agreement, the Board of Governors of the Fund approved
a set of far-reaching proposed amendments that took effect in July
1969.1 These established, among other things, a new Special Draw-
ing Account. In accordance with the provisions relating to this Ac-
count, the Fund has made allocations of special drawing rights
* Assistant General Counsel (Legislation), International Monetary Fund. A.B. 1954, LL.B.
1957, Harvard University; LL.M. 1965, Georgetown University Law Center; member of the
bars of the State of New York and the District of Columbia. This paper is a revised version
of a talk delivered at the Bielefeld Symposium on Monetary Instability in International Trade
and Investment at the Zentrum fdir interdisziplinlire Forschung of the University of Bielefeld
in the Federal Republic of Germany (June 13, 1975). The complete proceedings of that
Symposium are available in Monettire Probleme im internationalen Handel und
Kapitalverkehr, edited by N. Horn (Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1976). The
views expressed in this paper are those of the writer and do not necessarily express the views
of the International Monetary Fund.
' In addition, by Executive Board Decision No. 4773-(75/136), adopted August 1, 1975, the
Fund established a Subsidy Account in cooperation with members to assist those members
most seriously affected by the current situation to meet the cost of using resources made
available through the Fund's oil facility for 1975. By Executive Board Decision No. 5069-
(76/72), adopted May 5, 1976, the Fund established a Trust Fund for the purpose of providing
special balance of payments assistance to developing members with the profits from the sale
of gold together with other financing that may be available.
I Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter cited as Articles of Agree-
ment].
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, May 31,
1968, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748 (effective for United States July 28, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Amendment].
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(SDRs) to participants in the Account. These allocations were of a
new reserve asset and represent the first time that countries have
consciously decided to influence the amount of world liquidity.
The concept of value for both Accounts is closely bound up with
gold. Operations and transactions in the General Account were
premised on the concept of par value. This is a value of a member
currency declared in terms, directly or indirectly, of gold. Gold
value thus constituted the common denominator of the par value
system (although in a case of a fluctuating currency the Fund ap-
plied a market rate for the purpose of valuing its holdings of that
currency). The special drawing right was declared by the amended
Articles of Agreement to have a gold value as well. Nevertheless,
despite this similarity in their basic values, the methods of valua-
tion employed in transactions of the two Accounts differed. Trans-
actions of the General Account occurred at par value without regard
for the latitude that existed within the margins prescribed by the
Articles. By contrast, transactions between participants in the Spe-
cial Drawing Account were subject to an equal value principle, ac-
cording to which the value received by a transferor of special draw-
ing rights does not vary materially with the choice of transferee or
the currency that is provided in return for special drawing rights.
The principle of equal value was devised to deal with certain fluc-
tuations of rates permitted by the Fund through decisions that were
greater than those within the margins prescribed by the Articles. It
was effected by a rule that employed in calculations (1) representa-
tive market rates (rather than par values) for currencies other than
the dollar and (2) the par value for the dollar (on the assumption
that the United States freely bought and sold gold in accordance
with the Articles of Agreement).
While the par value system functioned successfully for approxi-
mately a quarter of a century, pressures gradually built up and
culminated in the events of August 1971. As floating spread, the
relations of currencies to gold became more and more theoretical.
The means of valuation both for the General Account and the Spe-
cial Drawing Account were called into question. Interim solutions
were pressed into service but these did not prevent difficult prob-
lems from arising. Chief among these solutions is the "basket"
method of valuation of the special drawing right. The members of
the international financial community are presently seeking to fash-
ion more permanent solutions. It is likely that they will be derived,
at least in part, from those that have already been forged.
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II. THE PAR VALUE SYSTEM
The financial experience of the 1930's was characterized by eco-
nomic nationalism, competitive devaluations, restrictions on and
shrinkage of international trade. The draftsmen of the Fund's Arti-
cles of Agreement wished to avoid a repetition of that experience in
the postwar world. The system they devised with this objective in
mind is known as the par value system.
One of the key premises of the par value system is that the estab-
lishment of and changes in exchange rates are not matters to be
relegated to the unfettered discretion of each sovereign state, but
rather are properly matters of international concern. Important pro-
visions of the Fund's Articles were designed to give effect to this
premise. In accordance with these provisions each original member
of the Fund and, by virtue of the membership resolution of subse-
quent members, each other member must declare a par value of its
currency. This par value, agreed between the member and the
Fund, represents a fixed relationship of the member's currency to
gold. This relationship may be expressed directly or indirectly
through the medium of a U.S. dollar, the gold value of which was
fixed as of July 1, 1944.
While the set of relationships between currencies that resulted
from the establishment by members of par values was intended to
be reasonably stable, it was recognized that after a member had
established a par value, economic developments might justify a
change in that value. Procedures were designed to regulate such a
change.
Members were obligated to ensure that exchange rate transac-
tions involving their own and other members' currencies taking
place within their territories are kept within certain margins above
and below the declared par value. Under the Articles of Agreement,
the margin for spot exchange transactions is one percent, but the
Fund found the authority under its power to approve multiple cur-
' In accordance with the Articles, a member contemplating a change in the par value of
its currency must consult the Fund before the change. The Articles provide that only the
member may propose a change in the par value of its currency. A member must not propose
a change except to correct a "fundamental disequilibrium." The concurrence of the Fund is
required for all changes but two. Generally the Fund has latitude to concur or not in a
proposal for change, although in one instance it is required to concur and in another, it cannot
object. The Fund can object to a proposed change in par value when the extent of the change,
in the Fund's judgment, is not sufficient to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. In accord-
ance with a decision of the Fund, however, in determining the necessary extent of a change,
the member will be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt.
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rency practices to effect a widening of the margins. By Decision No.
904-(59/32), July 24, 1959, it decided to approve margins of two per
cent when they arose from the maintenance of margins of one per
cent for transactions involving a member's currency and the con-
vertible currency of another member. The Articles also provide that
a member is deemed to be performing its obligation in respect of
margins if it freely buys and sells gold for the settlement of interna-
tional transactions at prices within the limits prescribed by the
Fund. The United States availed itself of this provision for many
years until August 1971. 5
Ill. THE GENERAL AccOUNT
The intention of the Articles is that par values should constitute
the basic normative values for calculation in the General Account.
This follows from article IV, section 1(b) which provides: "All com-
putations relating to currencies of members for the purpose of
applying the provisions of this Agreement shall be on the basis of
their par values." In order to understand the General Account and
the problems of valuation to which it gives rise, it is necessary to
examine certain of its aspects.
Under the Fund's Articles of Agreement, each member country is
assigned a quota. This represents the member's financial participa-
tion in the Fund. A member's quota is important for several reasons.
From it flow a member's voting rights as well as, generally, its
entitlement to purchase currencies of other members from the
Fund. It is also the basis of allocations of special drawing rights from
the Special Drawing Account.
A member's quota is equal to its subscription. The latter must be
paid in gold and the member's own currency. The amount that a
member must pay in gold is normally 25 percent of its quota. The
remaining 75 percent is payable in the member's currency although
it should be noted that in certain circumstances the Articles of
Agreement permit variations from this norm.
As a consequence of the subscriptions of its members the Fund
owns and holds in its General Account substantial resources of gold
and currencies, the value of which must be accounted for in the
Fund's financial statements. These resources are augmented by the
receipt of charges the Fund makes for the use of its resources by
I See generally Gold, The Legal Structure of the Par Value System, 5 L. & POLICY IN INT'L
Bus. 155 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gold, Legal Structure].
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members. They may be augmented in the course of borrowing by the
Fund.
A member may use the Fund's resources by purchasing from the
Fund currencies of other members in return for an equivalent
amount of the member's own currency' or gold. In order for the
Fund's resources to revolve for the benefit of other members, a pur-
chase must not remain outstanding for more than a temporary pe-
riod.
There are two basic methods of ensuring that the use of the
Fund's resources by a member are not unduly prolonged. The first
method is a member's repurchase from the Fund of its own cur-
rency. This may be effected by the payment of gold, special drawing
rights or the convertible currencies of other members.
The second basic method of ensuring a temporary use of the
Fund's resources in the General Account so that they can revolve
for the benefit of others is the sale by the Fund of a purchasing
member's currency to other members. To the extent that this is
done, the purchasing member's obligation under the Articles of
Agreement as well as the repurchase declaration that it makes at
the time of its initial purchase are discharged.7
IV. MAINTENANCE OF VALUE IN THE GENERAL ACCOUNT
From the summary description of the General Account above, it
may be appreciated that a mechanism of value maintenance is nec-
essary for at least two good reasons.
In the first place, it is apparent that a mechanism is necessary to
deal with changes in the par values if these changes are not to result
in haphazard profits or losses to the Fund on its currency holdings.
' The character of this transaction does not fit the legal analysis of a loan, among other
reasons, since payment by the member is made at the time it receives the currencies of other
members from the Fund. On the other hand, from an economic standpoint, the member is
receiving a form of financial assistance from the Fund that must be unwound.
' Under the Articles of Agreement there is no fixed date by which a member must repur-
chase its own currency from the Fund. There are, however, detailed provisions in the Articles
that give rise to an obligation to repurchase as a member's balance of payments position
improves and its monetary reserves increase. Since this change in position may not be accom-
plished with certainty within a temporary period, this obligation to repurchase under the
Articles of Agreement may not be activated for some time. Accordingly, upon making a
purchase from the Fund, it has become the practice of a member to state, pursuant to Fund
policy, that it will repurchase not later than three to five years after the date of purchase.
This practice, often obligatory, derives from the policy set out in Executive Board Decision
No. 102-(52/11), adopted Feb. 13, 1952, reprinted in INT'L MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECI-
SIONS OF THE INT'L MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 37-40 (7th Issue 1975)
1hereinafter cited as IMF Decisions & Documents].
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Undesired profits and losses might arise not only from changes in
the par values of member currencies, but from changes in their
market values as well, even if the stated par values remained con-
stant. In the second place, if a mechanism is to deal with this prob-
lem, it is necessary from its construction to understand upon whom
the obligations will rest during the course of transactions.
The provision in the Fund's Articles of Agreement that provides
for the maintenance of value of the Fund's holdings of member
currencies in the General Account is article IV, section 8. This provi-
sion reads:
Section 8. Maintenance of gold value of the Fund's assets
(a) The gold value of the Fund's assets shall be maintained
notwithstanding changes in the par or foreign exchange value of
the currency of any member.
(b) Whenever (i) the par value of a member's currency is re-
duced, or (ii) the foreign exchange value of a member's currency
has, in the opinion of the Fund, depreciated to a significant extent
within that member's territories, the member shall pay to the
Fund within a reasonable time an amount of its own currency
equal to the reduction in the gold value of its currency held by the
Fund.
(c) Whenever the par value of a member's currency is in-
creased, the Fund shall return to such member within a reasonable
time an amount in its currency equal to the increase in the gold
value of its currency held by the Fund.
(d) The provisions of this Section shall apply to a uniform
proportionate change in the par values of the currencies of all
members, unless at the time when such a change is made the Fund
decides otherwise by an eighty-five percent majority of the total
voting power.
The circumstances in which the provision is operative are: (a) deval-
uation; (b) revaluation; (c) depreciation; and (d) appreciation.'
(a) A member must pay to the Fund an amount of its currency
equal to a reduction in the gold value of its currency held by the
Fund whenever the par value of the member's currency is reduced.
This change in value of a currency constitutes a devaluation.
While the Fund is thus clearly assured that it will not suffer loss
as a result of a member's devaluation, the mechanism of distribut-
' In order to aid in the understanding of this provision, the explanation that follows as-
sumes the functioning of the par value system in the manner that prevailed prior to the events
of August 1971. Changes in the application of the provision made necessary by the faltering
of this system are described subsequently.
[Vol. 6:493
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ing the risks involved needs to be considered in the context of Gen-
eral Account transactions.
If a member whose currency has been purchased from the Fund
in a transaction by another member devalues subsequent to that
purchase, the devaluing member is required to pay to the Fund an
additional amount of its currency equivalent in gold value to the
gold value of the amount of currency that the Fund holds immedi-
ately before the devaluation. Since the Fund's holdings of the cur-
rency that undergoes devaluation have been partially depleted by
the sale of that currency tQ another member, the devaluing mem-
ber's obligation to restore gold value extends only to the balance of
its currency remaining with the Fund at the time of the devaluation
and not to balances that the Fund previously held. Moreover, the
devaluing member has no obligation to pay any amount to the mem-
ber that purchased its currency from the Fund even if the purchaser
can show that, at the time of devaluation, it had yet retained all or
some of that currency in its holdings.
While the purchasing member will not benefit by any obligation
of the devaluing member to restore gold value inasmuch as that
obligation runs only to the Fund, it may find that its purchase
obligation has been affected in one case. At the time that the pur-
chase was made, the purchaser transferred in gold value an equiva-
lent amount of its own currency to the Fund. There is no require-
ment that the purchaser must repurchase with the currency that
was the object of its purchase.' Nevertheless, if the member does
repurchase with that currency, the calculation of repurchase will be
made at the new (devalued) par value of the currency rather than
at the former par value on which the purchase price was calculated
so that more units of that currency will be repaid than were pur-
chased.
(b) The Fund must return to a member an amount of its cur-
rency equal to the increase in the gold value of its currency held by
the Fund whenever the par value of the member's currency is in-
creased. This change in value of a currency constitutes a
revaluation.
This mechanism is the obverse of that of a devaluation. The Fund
is not permitted to accrue a profit and must adjust its holdings of
As has been noted earlier, repurchases may be made in gold, special drawing rights, or,
subject to certain limitations, the convertible currencies of other members. They may be
prescribed in accordance with the provisions of article V, § 7(b), and schedule B of the
Articles of Agreement, supra note 2.
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the revalued currency proportionately. The adjustment is in respect
of its actual holdings of currency at the time of the revaluation. A
member that had purchased the same currency from the Fund prior
to the revaluation has no duty to return any amount of its purchase
to the issuer even if some or all of the purchase still remains in the
purchaser's holdings on the date of revaluation. If the purchaser
should decide, subject to the law and policies of the Fund, to repur-
chase its own currency from the Fund with the same kind of cur-
rency that it had purchased, the repurchase will be on the basis of
the new par value rather than that prevailing at the time of pur-
chase. Accordingly, it will part with fewer currency units of the
revalued currency than those that it acquired at the time of pur-
chase.
(c) A member must pay to the Fund an amount of its currency
equal to a reduction in the gold value of its currency held by the
Fund when, in the opinion of the Fund, the foreign exchange value
of the member's currency has fallen to a significant extent within
the member's territories-even though no change has been made in
its par value. This change in value of a currency constitutes a
depreciation.
The section of the Fund's Articles that governs the maintenance
of gold value of the Fund's assets is not limited to situations in
which the par value of a member's currency is changed. By express
language, article IV, section 8(b) requires a member to make pay-
ments to the Fund when "the foreign exchange value of a member's
currency has, in the opinion of the Fund, depreciated to a significant
extent within that member's territories . . . ."10 While the Articles
nowhere expressly provide for it, as a necessary implication of this
language the Fund has substituted a book rate for the par value of
a currency that depreciates. While the book rate does not constitute
a new par value, it provides a basis for making more realistic com-
putations when a significant depreciation from par value has oc-
curred. The book rate, determined in relation to the U.S. dollar,
approximates the exchange rate of the affected currency on the
market."
10 Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 8(b).
Executive Board Decision No. 321-(54/32), adopted June 15, 1954. This decision was
terminated by Executive Board Decision No. 3637-(72/41) G/S, adopted May 8, 1972,
reprinted in IMF Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 32, which, in conjunction with
Executive Board Decision No. 4667-(75/82), adopted May 16, 1975, prescribes that computa-
tions are to be made on the basis of representative market rates determined in accordance
with rule 0-3.
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(d) The Fund must return to a member an amount of its cur-
rency equal to an increase in the gold value of its currency held by
the Fund, whenever, in the opinion of the Fund, the foreign ex-
change value of the member's currency has risen within the mem-
ber's territories to a significant extent-even though no change has
been made in its par value. This change in the par value of a cur-
rency constitutes an appreciation.
While express provision is made in the Articles to govern the case
of depreciation, by oversight or otherwise, the draftsmen did not
explicitly cover the case of appreciation in the same language. The
matter became acute during a consideration of how the Fund should
deal with a fluctuating exchange rate.
Under the Articles, members must ensure that exchange transac-
tions within their territories are within the permitted margins
which, in the case of spot transactions, are alternatively one per-
cent'" or two percent if the latter results from the maintenance of
margins of not more than one percent from parity for a convertible
currency.'" If a member did not observe this obligation, its currency
would be floating if it were either observing no margins or margins
greater than those permitted.
In a decision of the Executive Directors, the Fund held that, even
though express authority does not appear in article IV, section 8, as
a necessary implication of the general enabling language of subsec-
tion (a) of that section, the Fund may adjust its holdings of a cur-
rency by returning an amount to a member in the event of apprecia-
tion." The decision provided for the establishment by the Fund of
an account payable in the event of appreciation (and an account
receivable in the event of depreciation) of a member's currency,
together with provision for settlement.
While the discussion thus far has centered on the standard main-
tenance of value mechanism in the Fund's General Account, a con-
sideration of the maintenance of value provisions in the Fund's
Articles applicable to this Account would not be complete without
a reference to article IV, section 8(d). This subsection, in conjunc-
12 Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 3(i).
Executive Board Decision No. 904-(59/32), adopted July 24, 1959, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 13.
" Executive Board Decision No. 321-(54/32), adopted June 15, 1954. See note 13 supra,
where it is indicated the termination of the agreement. The Articles provide: "The gold value
of the Fund's assets shall be maintained notwithstanding changes in the par or foreign ex-
change value of the currency of any member." Id. art. IV, § 8(a). See Articles of Agreement,
supra note 2.
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tion with article IV, section 7, covers the possibility of uniform
changes in the par values of all member currencies in relation to
gold. This is equivalent to a change in the price of gold in terms of
member currencies. Subsection (d) of section 8 deals with the conse-
quences of this unusual action in terms of the maintenance or non-
maintenance of gold value. Section 7 deals with the majority neces-
sary to take such action and the method by which an individual
member can opt out of such action. It should be noted that these
provisions have never been used. They were designed to affect the
production of gold, the size of the Fund and world liquidity in gen-
eral. The last of these items may now be affected by the allocation
and cancellation of special drawing rights.
An examination of subsection (d) discloses two possible courses
of action that the Fund might take in the event of a uniform propor-
tionate change in par value. If it does not expressly waive the main-
tenance of gold value provisions of section 8, these will apply. Ac-
cordingly, each member that does not opt out of the decision would
have to pay to the Fund an additional amount of its own currency
upon a uniform proportionate devaluation while the Fund would
have to return to each such member an amount of its currency in
the event of a uniform proportionate revaluation. On the other
hand, the Fund may, by a decision taken with 85 percent of the total
voting power, decide to dispense with transfers of currency after a
uniform proportionate change. The possible effects of such a deci-
sion are analyzed in depth elsewhere. 5
Putting to one side a uniform proportionate change in par values,
one should understand, by way of conclusion, that the functions of
the standard maintenance of value mechanism in the Fund's Gen-
eral Account are several. The gold value of the Fund's holdings is
assured regardless of change in the par values of foreign exchange
values of member currencies. This carries with it the corollary that
the Fund is insulated from fortuitous gains and losses that would
arise from uncompensated changes in the values of its currency
holdings. At the same time, stability of value is imported into the
financial relations of the Fund and its members. These relations
have several aspects. First, the Fund's adjusted holdings of the
member's currency as a percentage of its quota remain constant.
Second, the value of the entitlements of other members to purchase
" See J. GOLD, MAINTENANCE OF THE GOLD VALUE OF THE FUND'S ASSETS 35-42 (2d ed. 1971).
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the currency whose value has changed remains unaffected. Third,
the repurchase obligations of members are not disturbed."6
V. THE SPECIAL DRAWING ACCOUNT
On August 5, 1969 the amendments to the Articles of Agreement
providing for a Special Drawing Account became effective. 7 Hence-
forth, while the Fund would continue to constitute a single juridical
person, its operations and transactions would be conducted through
two different Accounts. Subsequent to the amendments, approxi-
mately 9.3 billion units of SDRs were allocated to member countries
that became participants in the Account." The allocations were
made on the basis of their quotas.
Three basic methods of using SDRs were envisaged. (1) In what
has been described as the central transaction in special drawing
rights, a participant having a balance of payments need or one
arising out of developments in its reserves is entitled to transfer
special drawing rights to another participant that has been desig-
nated by the Fund in return for convertible currency. 9 (2) In an-
other transaction, useful particularly to a reserve currency country
whose currency is held in the reserves of other countries, a partici-
pant having the requisite need may enter into a transaction with
another participant even though the latter has not been designated
by the Fund, if the two parties agree between them. In this type of
transaction, the reserve currency country transfers special drawing
rights to the transferee and the transferee provides in return cur-
rency of the transferor.2 0 (3) Transfers of special drawing rights may
be made by a participant to the Fund's General Account for the
purpose of repurchasing its own currency or paying charges on the
use of the Fund's resources.2'
Unlike the General Account, the Special Drawing Account does
not hold gold and currencies which must be maintained in gold
See generally id.
" Amendment, supra note 3. See generally J. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS CHARACTER
AND USE (2d ed. 1970).
See generally, W. HABERMEIER, OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS IN SDRs (1973).
Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. XXV, § 2(a).
Id. art. XXV, § 2(b)(i).
Id. art. XXV, §§ 7(b) and (c). SDRs can be used in discharge of an article V, § 7(b)
repurchase obligation only to the extent that the obligation arises in SDRs, but not in substi-
tution of other media. SDRs can be used to discharge voluntary repurchases by Executive
Board decision. For the use of SDRs in repurchases outside article V, § 7(b), see Executive
Board Decision No. 2901-(69/122) G/S, adopted Dec. 18, 1969, reprinted in IMF Decisions &
Documents, supra note 7, at 155, 157.
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value. In contrast to the General Account, the Fund's Special Draw-
ing Account was not created by the transfer of resources from partic-
ipants. Article XXI, section 2 of the Fund's Articles fixes the value
of a unit of SDRs in terms of gold: "The unit of value of special
drawing rights shall be equivalent to 0.888671 gram of fine gold." It
is then necessary to translate the value of the SDR into the currency
that forms its countervalue in a transaction.
VI. EQUAL VALUE PRINCIPLE SELECTED OVER PAR VALUE FOR TRANS-
ACTIONS IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING ACCOUNT
During the drafting of the provisions relating to the Special Draw-
ing Account, the possibility was considered that SDRs should be
exchanged at the par values of currencies by analogy with the Gen-
eral Account. Most of the considerations that led to a rejection of
this possibility focused on what was thought to be the more likely
transactions in SDRs, i.e., those by designation. In this kind of
transaction, a participant with the requisite balance of payments or
reserve need may transfer its special drawing rights to a participant
designated by the Fund. The designation is made on the basis of a
judgment by the Fund that the prospective transferee's balance of
payments and reserve position is sufficiently strong. In a transaction
by designation, the transferor of SDRs has no choice as to which
participant will be designated. The designated participant, how-
ever, has a choice as to which "currency convertible in fact" it may
provide in exchange for SDRs.22 Because of these two considerations
the draftsmen of the SDR provisions sought to avoid the possibility
that if a designated transferee of special drawing rights were able
to satisfy its obligation by providing currency at par value, it might
decide to tender to the transferor a currency that was at a discount
at the market (even if within the prescribed or subsequent wider23
margins)." The result would be a loss to the transferor. To avoid the
22 The transferor of special drawing rights in a designated transaction is allowed to select
the currency convertible in fact that it wishes to receive while the transferee of the special
drawing rights is permitted to choose the currency convertible in fact that it will provide. The
reconciliation of these concepts through the obligation of the issuer of the currency provided
is explained infra.
2 Executive Board Decision No. 904-(59/32), adopted July 24, 1959, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 13, allowed margins of two percent if they result
from the maintenance of margins of not more than one percent from parity for a convertible
currency.
24 As is discussed afterwards in this paper, a system of even wider margins was recognized
by Executive Board Decision No. 3463-(71/126), adopted Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 14, and by Executive Board Decision No. 4083-
(73/104), adopted Nov. 7, 1973, reprinted in IMF Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at
18.
[Vol. 6:493
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
possibility of such a loss, a different system of value was devised for
the purpose of translating the value of the SDR, expressed in terms
of gold, into a value in terms of the currency being used.
In a transfer of special drawing rights from one participant to
another, when the transferor is using them to meet balance of pay-
ments needs or in light of developments in its reserves, the trans-
feree designated by the Fund must provide "currency convertible in
fact ' 25 although, it may not, in the first instance, be the currency
desired by the transferor. In fact, this concept involves two distinct
categories.
The first category (described in article XXXII(b)(1)) is defined
by several conditions. First, the currency must be convertible in
terms of article VIII or article IV, section 4(b).2 1 In accordance with
the second condition, any currency of the first category must be
interconvertible with any other currency of that category. This en-
sures that if the transferee provides a currency of the first category
other than that desired by the transferor of special drawing rights,
procedures must exist by which the issuer of the currency provided
will convert the balances of its own currency into the currency that
the transferor wants." Finally, there is a requirement, to be dis-
cussed subsequently, of "equal value." It may be noted that three
currencies-the French franc, the pound sterling and the U.S. dol-
lar-became currencies of the first category.
A currency of the second category (described in article
XXXII(b)(2)) is defined by two conditions. The first condition is
that satisfactory procedures must exist for conversion of balances by
the issuer into one or more of the currencies of the first category.
25 Article XXXII provides:
(b) Currency convertible in fact means:
(1) a participant's currency for which a procedure exists for the conversion of
balances of the currency obtained in transactions involving special drawing rights
into each other currency for which such procedure exists, at rates of exchange
prescribed under Article XXV, Section 8, and which is the currency of a participant
that
(i) has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, or
(ii) for the settlement of international transactions in fact freely buys
and sells gold within the limits prescribed by the Fund under Section 2
of Article IV: or
(2) currency convertible into a currency described in paragraph (1) above at
rates of exchange prescribed under Article XXV, section 8.
Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. XXXII. See generally J. Gou, THE FUND'S CONCEPM
OF CONVERTIBILITY 37 (1971) [hereinaffer cited as GOLD, CONVERTIBILITY].
25 L.e., the participant is buying and selling gold within the meaning of article IV, § 4(b) of
Articles of Agreement, supra note 2.
27 See GoLD, CONVERTIBILITY, supra note 24, at 42.
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While every currency of the first category must be interconvertible
with all other currencies of that category, a currency of the second
category need not be convertible into other currencies of its cate-
gory. The procedures for conversion of a currency of the second
category into a currency of the first category must ensure that the
conversion will be at the rates prescribed so as to effect equal value.
Five currencies-the Belgian franc, the deutsche mark, the Italian
lira, the Mexican peso and the Netherlands guilder-became cur-
rencies of the second category.
The interaction between the two categories of currency may
briefly be described as follows. A transferor of special drawing rights
may request and is entitled to any currency of the first category. The
transferee, while not obligated to provide the specific currency re-
quested, must provide currency convertible in fact of either cate-
gory. The currency provided will be convertible, directly or indi-
rectly, into the currency requested. A transferor may not insist on
receiving a currency of the second category although the transferee
may choose to provide it.
As has been noted, a vital condition of both the first and second
categories of currency is that the conversion envisaged must be at
rates of exchange prescribed in a manner to give "equal value" in
accordance with article XXV, section 8(a). The latter provision
states:
(a) The exchange rates for operations or transactions between
participants shall be such that a participant using special drawing
rights shall receive the same value whatever currencies might be
provided and whichever participants provide those currencies, and
the Fund shall adopt regulations to give effect to this principle.
The objective of the equal value principle is that the value of the
amount of currency received by the transferor of special drawing
rights will not differ materially between different transferees and
currencies. The principle is applied so as to require the transferee
to provide an amount of currency that, after conversion by the is-
suer, would result in the same value that would have been received
had the desired currency been furnished the transferor in the first
instance.38 The official monetary authorities of the currency pro-
vided by the transferee of the SDRs are responsible in conversion
(even if conducted through the market) for seeing that equal value
is made available in accordance with the Fund's Rules and Regula-
tions.
11 See J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS-XI 220 (1975).
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In order to make effective the equal value principle, the Fund
adopted rule 0-3 of its Rules and Regulations. According to this
rule, 9 certain specified procedures for determining rates of exchange
were to be applied to ensure equal value for transactions in the
Special Drawing Account. The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar was
to be its par value. The rates of other currencies would be their
representative rates, as communicated by their authorities to the
Fund usually on the basis of an agreed formula involving an average
or midpoint in the market. 0 Following the rule, if a participant had
an exchange market in which the Fund found a representative rate
for spot delivery of the U.S. dollar, this representative rate for its
currency would apply. For other currencies, a cross rate would be
determined on the basis of representative rates and if this could not
be done, the Fund would determine the rate.
It should be noted that, under the original rule 0-3, computations
involving the representative rates were made in terms of these rates
against the dollar, which was considered to have a fixed relationship
to the SDR based on their common relationships to gold. The key
role of the U.S. dollar in the functioning of the original version of
rule 0-3 was based on its central position in the par value system
and the assumption that this system would continue in operation.
This position was, in turn, premised not only on the fact that the
U.S. dollar served as the primary intervention (and reserve) cur-
rency of most Fund members but also upon the continuing under-
taking of the United States authorities to sell gold to, or buy it from,
" The rule, in its original form, provided:
0-3. The exchange rate in terms of special drawing rights for a currency pro-
vided in a transaction between participants or involved in a conversion associated
with such a transaction, shall be
(i) for the United States dollar: its par value;
(ii) for the currency of a participant having an exchange market in
which the Fund finds that a representative rate for spot delivery for the
United States dollar can be readily ascertained: that representative rate;
(iii) for the currency of a participant having an exchange market in
which the Fund finds that a representative rate for spot delivery for the
United States dollar cannot be readily ascertained but in which a repre-
sentative rate can be readily ascertained for spot delivery for a currency
as described in (ii): the rate calculated by reference to the representative
rate for spot delivery for that currency and the rate ascertained pursuant
to (ii) above for the United States dollar in terms of that currency;
(iv) for any other currency: a rate determined by the Fund.
" The representative rate for the deutsche mark is the middle rate determined officially
during the official session of the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. While this rate and most
other representative rates are expressed in dollars, some are in terms of the pound sterling or
the French franc.
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the monetary authorities of other members in exchange for dollars
in the settlement of international transactions within the margins
established by the Fund for gold transactions. The latter undertak-
ing was the means by which the United States elected to perform
its obligation 31 consistent with the Fund's Articles of Agreement
concerning margins. While other members actively intervened in
their exchange markets buying and selling their own currency
against an intervention currency (usually the U.S. dollar) in order
to prevent exchange transactions from occurring outside the mar-
gins, the United States remained passive in its exchange markets.
As long as the United States chose to comply with its obligation by
freely buying and selling gold in the manner indicated, other Fund
members might consider the dollar "as good as gold" in the course
of performing their correlative obligations with respect to margins.
VII. WEAKNESS IN THE PAR VALUE SYSTEM
The years that ushered in the Special Drawing Account also gave
rise to some profound upheavals in the international financial sys-
tem. After a time of unprecedented prosperity coupled with a re-
gime of stable exchange rates, the par value system had come under
pressure. By May 1971, the authorities of major currency issuers
were considering various actions under the circumstances. In that
month both the German and the Dutch authorities advised the
Fund that, for a time, they would not maintain the exchange rates
for their currencies within the prescribed margins. A fundamental
weakness in the U.S. balance of payments culminated in the events
of August 15, 1971. On that day the United States authorities an-
nounced a suspension of the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into
gold and other reserve assets in other than exceptional circumstan-
ces. The United States would no longer freely buy and sell gold for
the settlement of international transactions,32 nor would it convert
holdings of dollars by the monetary authorities of other member
countries into gold or the currencies issued by those authorities.33
Insofar as the U.S. authorities had no plans to intervene in the
exchange market in support of the dollar, there was no longer an
assurance that exchange transactions between the U.S. dollar and
the currencies of other members would occur within the prescribed
31 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 4(b), and rule F-4 of the Fund's Rules
and Regulations.
' See Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 4.
Id. art. VIII, § 4.
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margins in the United States."4 In theory, the system might have
continued if members other than the United States had persevered
in intervening within their own exchange markets but these mem-
bers were reluctant to risk accumulating holdings of U.S. dollars in
consequence of such intervention if these were not to be convertible
by the United States into other reserve assets. In practice, after the
announcement most countries no longer took action to ensure that
exchange transactions occurring within their territories would be
related to par values. While exchange rates fluctuated in the mar-
kets, most major currencies began to appreciate against the dollar.
VIII. THE EVOLUTION OF AN INTERIM SYSTEM
By autumn of 1971, agreement had begun to emerge for an early
return to an orderly exchange system. A resolution was adopted in
October by the Fund's Board of Governors calling on all members
to collaborate with the Fund and with each other to maintain a
satisfactory structure of exchange rates within appropriate margins.
On December 17 and 18 the Ministers and Central Bank Governors
of the Group of Ten met at the Smithsonian Institution in Washing-
ton. They agreed on the realignment of the currencies of their coun-
tries. On December 18 the Fund adopted a decision entitled "Cen-
tral Rates and Wider Margins: A Temporary Regime" setting out
practices that members could follow in collaborating with the Fund
to promote exchange stability during a "temporary period preceding
the resumption of effective par values with appropriate margins."
While the two key features of the decision, central rates and wider
margins, are both incompatible with certain provisions of the
Fund's Articles of Agreement, they were thought appropriate under
the circumstances. The decision stated that if members chose to act
in accordance with its provisions, their conduct, although not con-
sistent with other obligations under the Articles, would be deemed
to be consistent with their obligation under article IV, section 4 to
collaborate with the Fund "to promote exchange stability, to main-
tain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and to
avoid competitive exchange alterations."35
In accordance with the decision, members could communicate to
the Fund a central rate (which differed from the existing par value)
in terms of gold, special drawing rights, or another member's cur-
rency. The latter two methods of expression would be translated by
1' See INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1972).
35 See Gold, Legal Structure, supra note 5, at 192.
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the Fund into terms of gold for the purpose of computations. Mar-
gins of up to 21/4 percent on either side of parity between the two
currencies involved in a spot exchange transaction might then be
observed by members. These margins were to be calculated on the
basis of either central rates or par values and would relate to the
movement of members' exchange rates against their intervention
currencies. If a member maintained the rates for its currency within
these margins in terms of its intervention currency, it was recog-
nized that margins of up to 4 1/2 percent in relation to currencies
other than its intervention currency might result.36 Under the deci-
sion, these wider margins were possible. They were not, however,
mandatory and members might choose instead to observe the nar-
rower margins prescribed by article IV, section 3 of the Fund Agree-
ment and Decision No. 904-(59/32).
The central rate decision was subsequently revised in November
197311 to allow a member that maintains a stable rate in terms of
an intervention currency to declare that rate to the Fund as a cen-
tral rate even though the intervention currency itself is floating. The
revision represented a fundamental change. The original decision of
1971 permitted a fixed grid of relationships among the currencies of
Fund members as had the par value system. The fixed grid had
given way to blocks of currencies freely floating against one another
and the revised decision took note of this evolution in the interim
system.
IX. THE INTERIM SYSTEM ENCOUNTERS PROBLEMS
An interim system conceived in an emergency was not likely to
be exempt from problems relating to the Fund's methods of valua-
tion. The basic problem that arose was how to value members'
currencies in the General Account and the Special Drawing Ac-
count. In what follows two aspects of this problem are discussed.
The first aspect was how to reflect in the Fund's Accounts a situa-
tion that occurred twice, in which for a period the exchange markets
already reflected a prospective devaluation in the U.S. dollar. The
second aspect concerned the valuation of special drawing rights for
use in the EEC narrow margin arrangement.
The Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 envisaged a re-
' In certain circumstances further margins of up to one percent might occur. See Executive
Board Decision No. 3463-(71/126), adopted Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in IMF Decisions &
Documents, supra note 7, at 14.
11 Executive Board Decision No. 4083-(73/104), adopted Nov. 7, 1973, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 18.
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alignment of currencies that included a prospective devaluation of
the U.S. dollar from a par value of $35 to one of $38 per fine ounce
of gold. While the decision was prospective in nature, 8 it was ex-
pected that its effect would be felt in the exchange markets immedi-
ately. Accordingly, the decision of the Fund on central rates and
wider margins was drafted in terms of "effective parity rates." In
this way, the decision permitted margins to be calculated as if the
par value change had already been made. The same principle was
reflected in another decision39 that was taken to allow the Fund to
act as if the prospective change in par value had already been made
for the purposes of transactions and operations involving currencies
conducted through the General Account and the Special Drawing
Account. According to this decision, whenever a transaction with
the Fund through its General Account involved a purchase or sale
of a currency of a member other than the one entering into the
transaction, concerning which wider margins or a central rate had
been opted for by the issuer, an adjustment of the Fund's holdings
of currency would be made.4° The basis for the adjustment was the
ratio of the representative rate for the member's currency to the
effective parity relationship between that currency and the mem-
ber's intervention currency. At the time of the adjustment the Fund
established accounts payable or receivable for subsequent settle-
ment based on the amount payable by or to the member under
article IV, section 8 in accordance with the change in gold value of
the member's currency held by the Fund.
By virtue of the same decision, a temporary change was made in
rule 0-3 which, as has been noted, governs the rates of exchange at
which participants in the Special Drawing Account provide or con-
vert currency when special drawing rights are transferred between
participants. Under the original version of the rule that exchange
rate for the U.S. dollar was taken to be its par value and the rates
for other currencies were representative rates in the exchange mar-
kets for the spot delivery of U.S. dollars. In view of the prospective
U.S. devaluation, it was recognized that the existing par value of
the dollar could not be used for calculating the amounts of dollars
to be provided in return for special drawing rights. Accordingly, the
decision suspended rule 0-3(i) and adopted a temporary formula
The official change in par value occurred on May 8, 1972.
, Executive Board Decision No. 3537-(72/3) G/S, adopted Jan. 4, 1972.
" The decision also provided for other times concerning which an adjustment would be
made. It did not require the United States to adjust the Fund's holdings of dollars.
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under which sterling or French francs could be provided on the basis
of their par values adjusted by reference to their effective parity
relationships to the U.S. dollar and their representatives rates.
When the official par value of the dollar was changed on May 8,
1972, the Fund adopted another decision that terminated the tem-
porary suspension of rule 0-3(i), thereby restoring the par value of
the dollar for use in the relevant computations.4
An interesting development occurred after the first central rates
and wider margins decision. Six members of the European Eco-
nomic Community-Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands-decided to maintain a maximum of
2.25 percent for rates in exchange transactions in their official mar-
kets between each other's currencies. It may be recalled that this
margin was less than the maximum possible under the Fund deci-
sion. At the same time, they decided not to undertake to maintain
margins against the U.S. dollar. In order to maintain the narrow
margins between their currencies, the six members agreed to inter-
vene in the exchange markets. In March 1973 they agreed that spe-
cial drawing rights would constitute one of the means of settlement
of obligations arising from their intervention in the markets. Subse-
quent to this agreement the market rates of several of these coun-
tries appreciated against the dollar. As a consequence, the countries
participating in the narrow margins arrangement became reluctant
to use SDRs in settlement of their obligations with one another.
Their reluctance to use their SDRs derived from the provision of rule
0-3 that, in implementing the equal value principle of article XXV,
section 8(a), provided for calculations to be made on the basis of the
U.S. dollar at par value. The effect of this was that, as their curren-
cies appreciated vis-A-vis the dollar in the markets, these countries
" When once again the decision was made to devalue the dollar in 1973, the problem of
how to reflect its prospective value for Fund purposes reappeared. As in the earlier case,
market rates reflected the prospective change. The Fund decided that until the value was
officially changed, for purposes of rule 0-3, the par value of the dollar in calculations involving
other currencies would be regarded in terms of its prospective value. Executive Board Deci-
sion No. 3865-(73/12) G/S, adopted Feb. 16, 1973. Accordingly, once again when computations
were made for the purpose of transactions of the General Account involving currencies for
which the margins of the Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, or the margins of Executive
Board Decision No. 904 (59/32) adopted July 24, 1959, reprinted in IMF Decision & Docu-
ments, supra note 7, at 13, were not being maintained, the basis of such computations being
the representative rate under rule 0-3, it was provided that they would be made on the basis
of the "effective parity relationship" (implying the prospective U.S. par value) between the
currency involved and the U.S. dollar. This decision lapsed and the provisions of rule 0-3
applied in the usual way after the establishment of the new par value of the U.S. dollar on
October 18, 1973.
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saw the value of their SDRs declining in terms of their own curren-
cies.12
The solution of the problem was to suspend temporarily the oper-
ation of article XXV, section 8(a), pursuant to article XXIX, sec-
tion 1. The result was a temporary suspension of the equal value
principle but only in the case of transactions by agreement under
article XXV, section 2(b)(i)43 and not for the case of transactions by
designation. Transactions by agreement, under this decision, could
now be undertaken by the countries observing the narrow margins
arrangement among themselves based on their par values or central
rates as an alternative to the valuation method of rule 0-3. These
transactions involved purchases by the user of the SDRs of balances
of its own currency held by another participant. Transfers of SDRs
other than in this category continued to take place at the rates
prescribed in accordance with rule 0-3. The suspension of the equal
value principle, which had been made by the Executive Directors
for a period of 120 days was extended by a Board of Governors
resolution for an additional period of 240 days and ended on October
31, 1974.44
X. SDR BASKET VALUATION
Before the amendments to the Fund's Articles were drafted that
would give rise to the Special Drawing Account, much consideration
was given to the matter of setting a value for the SDR. As has been
noted, it was decided to link its value to gold and, accordingly, the
value of the SDR was set out in article XXI, section 2 in terms of
0.888671 gram of fine gold. Calculation of this value in terms of gold
into currency rates of exchange presented little difficulty so long as
the par value system remained intact.
Criticism of the method of calculating exchange rates for the SDR
arose after August 15, 1971, when the United States authorities
announced that they would no longer freely buy and sell gold. It may
be recalled that under the original form of rule 0-3, the exchange
rate for the U.S. dollar in terms of SDRs was determined by refer-
ence to the par value of the dollar while exchange rates for other
currencies were derived from their representatives rates against the
dollar. These computations proceeded on the basis of a fixed rela-
tionship between the dollar and the SDR based on their common
" See INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1974).
" See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
" Board of Governors Resolution No. 29-2, effective March 4, 1974.
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relationships to gold and variable relationships between the dollar
(and hence the SDR) and other currencies. When the U.S. authori-
ties made their announcement of August 15, 1971, doubts began to
arise as to whether the gold value of the dollar was sufficiently
meaningful for the SDR to be founded on a fixed relationship with
the dollar.15 The criticism grew when, as the major European curren-
cies appreciated in 1973 against the dollar, the countries involved
found the value of their SDRs declining in terms of their own curren-
cies.
Gradually a consensus developed in favor of replacing the transla-
tion of the gold value of the SDR into currencies through the me-
dium of a single currency (the dollar) by substituting a "basket" of
currencies. While the theoretical gold value of the SDR would thus
be preserved, a different approach would be sought for its calcula-
tion into currencies. By January 1974, the Committee of the Board
of Governors of the International Monetary Fund on Reform of the
International Monetary System and Related Issues (Committee of
Twenty) agreed that, for an interim period and without deciding the
method of valuation to be adopted in a reformed system, the valua-
tion of the SDR should be based on a basket of currencies. The
Committee requested the Fund's Executive Directors to develop the
composition of such a basket and other matters concerning it.
During the discussions of the Executive Directors, various ap-
proaches had been suggested. One suggestion, for example, was that
the SDR might be stabilized in terms of commodities.46 In effect this
would be indexing the SDR and it was decided that the result of this
might be to accelerate inflation. Another proposal that was dis-
carded involved tying the SDR to what was, from time to time, "the
strongest currency," with reference to its appreciation vis-a-vis
other currencies. Ideas crystallized around four concepts and the
standard basket idea finally prevailed."
On July 1, 1974, the Fund put into effect its new SDR valuation
technique." The Executive Directors had selected sixteen currencies
'1 See Cutler & Gupta, SDRs: Valuation and Interest Rate, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Dec.
1974, at 18 [hereinafter cited as Cutler & Gupta].
4 See J. POLAK, VALUATION AND RATE OF INTEREST OF THE SDR 12 (1974).
The three leading contenders were the asymmetrical basket, the adjustible basket, and
the par value technique. For an explanation of these concepts, see Outline of Reform, Annex
9, in INT'L MONETARY FUND, INT'L MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
TWENTY 43-45 (1974).
11 See generally Int'l Monetary Fund Press Release No. 74/34 (July 1, 1974), Steps Used in
Valuation by New Method Outlined, in IMF SURVEY, July 8, 1974, at 1; Cutler & Gupta, supra
note 45; Cutler, The Valuation of the SDR, in EUROMONEY, Aug. 1974, at 27.
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to comprise the basket and assigned to each a percentage weight.
The currencies that were selected were those having a share in world
exports of goods and services averaging more than one percent over
the period 1968-1972. The relative weights for each currency are
broadly proportionate to the issuer's exports, but reflect some modi-
fication in recognition that share in trade alone does not necessarily
provide a sufficient measure of a currency's significance in the inter-
national economy. The currencies chosen and their relative weights,
as a percentage of the basket, are:
United States 33 Belgium 3.5
Germany 12.5 Sweden 2.5
United Kingdom 9 Australia 1.5
France 7.5 Spain 1.5
Japan 7.5 Norway 1.5
Canada 6 Denmark 1.5
Italy 6 Austria 1
Netherlands 4.5 South Africa 1
Before putting the basket into operation, it was necessary to con-
vert these percentages into amounts of each currency. An important
objective was to ensure a continuity of valuation so that on the last
day of the old valuation, June 28, the value for the SDR in terms of
the old method (SDR 1 = US $1.20635) that employed the par value
of the dollar exactly equalled the value calculated on the basis of
the new basket. Thereafter, of course, the value has changed from
day to day in accordance with movements in the foreign exchange
markets. The amounts of each currency in the basket were calcu-
lated on June 28, 1974 as follows:
Currency Units of Currency
in One SDR
U.S. dollar 0.40
Deutsche mark 0.38
Pound sterling 0.045
French franc 0.44
Japanese yen 26
Canadian dollar 0.071
Italian lira 47
Netherlands guilder 0.14
Belgian franc 1.6
Swedish krona 0.13
Australian dollar 0.012
Danish krone 0.11
Norwegian krone 0.099
Spanish peseta 1.1
Austrian schilling 0.22
South African rand 0.0082
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These currency amounts appear in the amended rule 0-3 of the
Fund's Rules and Regulations."
In calculating the exchange rate for the SDR against any given
currency, for example the deutsche mark, it would be possible to
value each of the currency components at its market rate against the
deutsche mark. The sum of the deutsche mark equivalents of each
currency component would give the exchange rate for the SDR in
terms of the deutsche mark. This method of calculation would,
however, occasion some inconvenience to the Fund. Accordingly,
the Fund uses market rates for the U.S. dollar. Except for the yen,
these rates are ordinarily the middle spot-exchange rates between
buying and selling rates quoted at noon in the London Exchange
market."' The rates of currencies other than the dollar are derived
from the SDR/dollar rate and the representative market exchange
rates for these currencies. It will be noted that, as under the initial
version of rule 0-3, in order to calculate the rate for the SDR in terms
of a currency other than the U.S. dollar, it is first necessary to
calculate the rate for the SDR in terms of the dollar. This is a matter
of practice and does not confer any special status on the dollar. The
vital distinction between the old and the new methods of valuation
in this context is that the SDR/dollar relation is no longer fixed, but
varies daily.
After the SDR/dollar rate is determined, the Fund is able to cal-
culate rates for the SDR against other currencies by using their
market rates against the U.S. dollar. These rates are the representa-
tive rates that have been agreed between members and the Fund
and are reported to the Fund by the appropriate central bank.
The effect of the new method of valuation of the SDR has gone
beyond its primary purpose of serving calculations in respect of the
Special Drawing Account. Since early in 1972 when the Fund found
it necessary to decide that calculations based on par value had
become largely inappropriate, calculations in the General Account
have generally been made on the basis of the representative rates
that were being applied for the purposes of the Special Drawing
Account.5' When the Fund decided to employ its new method of
valuation in the Special Drawing Account, it also decided to carry
' The amended rule 0-3 is set out in the Appendix to this article.
See rule 0-3(b) and Executive Board Decision No. 4234-(74/67), adopted June 13, 1974.
Provision is made to obtain the rates from New York, or failing this, from the Frankfurt
market if they cannot be obtained from the London market. The rate for the yen is its
representative rate.
11 Executive Board Decision No. 3537-(72/3) G/S, adopted Jan. 4, 1972. In accordance with
this decision, the Fund adjusted its holdings of members' currencies under article IV, section
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over this method for determining the exchange value of its currency
holdings52 and for transactions between the Fund and participants
in special drawing rights. In accordance with the decisions presently
in force, the Fund makes adjustments in its currency holdings on
the basis of the representative rates in accordance with rule 0-3 in
respect of each currency for which rates within the margins of article
IV, section 3 or Executive Board Decision No. 904-(59/32) are not
maintained:
(i) whenever calculations are made for a transaction with the
Fund involving the sale or purchase of that member's currency by
another member;53
(ii) annually on April 30;
(iii) at the close of the last business day of each month with
respect to the Fund's holdings of U.S. dollars; and
(iv) whenever a member requests the Fund to adjust the
Fund's holdings of its currency. 5
XI. CONCLUSION
The Fund's experience with valuation in its Accounts may be seen
as a gloss on the maxim that "Experience is the life of the law."
Rules designed for use under one set of circumstances necessarily
have given way to other rules intended to measure and preserve
value during a time when members have been compelled to depart
from crucial obligations under the Fund's Articles of Agreement.
The earlier distinctions between the methods of ascertaining values
in the General Account and the Special Drawing Account have been
replaced by a uniform method of valuation evolved in the latter and
now used, as well, in the former Account. The experience gained is
likely to contribute to the further improvement of the international
monetary system."
8 on this basis in respect of currencies for which a central rate had been established or a wider
margin elected. The decision was superseded by Executive Board Decision No. 3637-(72/41)
G/S, adopted May 8, 1972, reprinted in IMF Decision & Documents, supra note 7, at 32.
52 Executive Board Decision No. 4257-(74/76), adopted June 28, 1974, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 34.
.11 Executive Board Decision No. 3637-(72/41) G/S, adopted May 8, 1972, reprinted in IMF
Decisions & Documents, supra note 7, at 32.
" Executive Board Decision No. 4667-(75/82), adopted May 16, 1975.
"' See generally Address by Gold, Law and Reform of the International Monetary System,
Seventh Conference on the Law of the World, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 1975. In March 1976,
the Executive Directors presented to the Board of Governors of the Fund a Proposed Second
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. This Amend-
ment, which was adopted effective April 30, 1976 by the Board of Governors, will introduce
a number of important and extensive changes in the Fund's Articles of Agreement. A number
of countries have already accepted the Amendment. Public Law No. 94-564 (Oct. 19, 1976)
authorizes its acceptance by the United States.
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APPENDIX
AMENDED RULE 0-3
0-3. (a) For the purpose of determining the exchange rate in terms of special drawing rights
for a currency provided in a transaction between participants or involved in a
conversion associated with such a transaction one special drawing right shall be
deemed to be equal to the sum of:
U.S. dollar 0.40
Deutsche mark 0.38
Pound sterling 0.045
French franc 0.44
Japanese yen 26
Canadian dollar 0.071
Italian lira 47
Netherlands guilder 0.14
Belgian franc 1.6
Swedish krona 0.13
Australian dollar 0.012
Danish krone 0.11
Norwegian krone 0.099
Spanish peseta 1.1
Austrian schilling 0.22
South African rand 0.0082
(b) One special drawing right in terms of the United States dollar shall be equal to the
sum of the equivalents in United States dollars of the amounts of the currencies
specified in (a) above, calculated on the basis of exchange rates established in
accordance with procedures decided from time to time by the Fund.
(c) One special drawing right in terms of a currency other than the United States dollar
shall be determined on the basis of the rate of the special drawing right in terms of
the United States dollar as established in accordance with (b) above and an ex-
change rate for that currency determined as follows:
(i) for the currency of a member having an exchange market in which the Fund
finds that a representative rate for spot delivery for the United States dollar
can be readily ascertained, that representative rate;
(ii) for the currency of a member having an exchange market in which the Fund
finds that a representative rate for spot delivery for the United States dollar
cannot be readily ascertained but in which a representative rate can be
readily ascertained for spot delivery for a currency as described in (i), the
rate calculated by reference to the representative rate for spot delivery for
that currency and the rate ascertained pursuant to (i) above for the United
States dollar in terms of that currency;
(iii) for any other currency, a rate determined by the Fund.
